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ABSTRACT 
Do investor time horizons lead to inefficient business conduct in the 
real economy? An extensive finance literature analyzes whether particular 
practices (e.g., high frequency trading and stock buybacks) lead firms to 
operate with inefficiently myopic investment horizons, and an extensive 
legal literature considers the appropriateness of policy interventions. This 
Article joins those debates by charting the space of possibilities: what 
might be the causes of problematic time horizons? What solutions are 
available? One implication of this analysis is that there may be unexplored 
market-based solutions located on the liability side of investors’ balance 
sheets. This Article also argues that we should avoid characterizing the 
time horizon problem in a manner that subtly endorses some contested 
perspective on the appropriate time horizon. Rather than investigating ex-
cessive “short-termism” or “long-termism,” our starting point should be 
the broader category of “wrong-termism.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The investor time horizon literature principally asks two questions. 
First, it asks the empirical question of whether firms inefficiently telescope 
their investment timelines to satisfy impatient patrons—in particular, 
public shareholders.1 Second, it asks the normative question of whether 
particular changes—oftentimes changes to the scope of shareholder 
influence—are accordingly justified.2 
While this literature is voluminous, I believe there are gains to be 
made in clarifying how its various parts fit together. To what sorts of time 
horizons are individuals subject to, and what are their sources? What 
solutions are there, how are solutions fitted to the various time horizon 
problems, and how do the various putative solutions interact with each 
other? 
This Article has three ambitions. First, it offers a conceptual analysis 
of the short-term versus long-term time horizon debate. It provides useful 
terminology and a taxonomy of both time horizon problems, as well as 
potential solutions. Second, it explores this conceptual space for some 
                                                     
 1. For just a few studies examining this question, see John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander 
Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342 
(2014) (arguing that public firms invest less than comparable private firms); John R. Graham, 
Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27 (2006) (presenting survey data to show that CFOs routinely sacrifice economic 
value to meet short-term earnings goals). Others have refuted some oft-cited evidence of short-
termism. See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C. Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows (Harv. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 17-062, 2017), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/17-
062_4b0ff13f-2654-475f-bd45-7b1f42bb936a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PQE-TMGY]. 
 2. See generally William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); Jack C. Coffee & Daria Palia, The Wolf at the Door: 
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2015). But see 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1637 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism-- In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 
BUS. L. 977 (2013). 
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operational insights useful to policy makers and future researchers. By 
reflecting on the solutions that have been considered, it is able to point out 
solution categories so far neglected. In particular, it shows that the 
literature has largely ignored, and the law has largely hindered, an 
important potential response to time horizon problems: liability transfer. 
Third, it coins a term that will be helpful to those studying time horizons: 
“wrong-termism.” The remaining paragraphs of this Introduction serve to 
define the term and to further clarify the scope and ambitions of this 
Article. 
Shareholder time horizon problems are usually imagined in terms of 
excessively short time horizons. Although this Article is certainly written 
with that critique in mind, its analysis is general to all investor time 
horizon problems. After all, defenders of alleged short-term investors may 
wish to accuse their opponents of excessive long-termism;3 turnabout is 
fair play, and I hope that this Article’s concepts can be of service, 
regardless of who invoke them. Movable type was essential to the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation alike. 
To emphasize this generality, and to avoid unintended associations, 
I largely avoid loaded terms such as “myopic.” To discuss arguably 
problematic time horizons, I abjure both “short-termism” and “long-
termism.” Instead, I propose that we speak of “wrong-termism” and “right-
termism.” Wrong-termism refers to both short-termism and long-termism. 
It is meant to cover the many ways that investors may not care just about 
discounted total returns or may otherwise deviate from the models 
described in corporate finance textbooks. 
Wrong-termism refers to a focus on a particular time horizon, 
whether near or far. For example, an investor is subject to wrong-termism 
if the investor shows special interest in a particular quarter’s earnings, or 
in the exact market price thirty years. Any such focus counts as wrong-
termism, regardless of whether it actually influences investor conduct or 
corporate policy, and regardless of whether the peculiar focus can 
ultimately be justified. This Article’s inquiry is about how to detect, study, 
and solve wrong-termism, whatever term that may be. 
While I use the term “wrong-termism” to refer to merely caring about 
peculiar terms, regardless of the effects, wrong-termism is more 
interesting when it actually influences corporate policy, which I call the 
“wrong-termist effect.” And it is more interesting still when its effects are 
socially costly, which I call “socially inefficient wrong-termism.” 
This Article frequently discusses wrong-termism, pointing to 
observed phenomena in the economy—some investors do fixate on hourly 
                                                     
 3. Cf. Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 
1554 (2015). 
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stock swings—prior to passing empirical judgments about whether this 
wrong-termism influences the economy, or normative judgments about 
whether it is a good thing. 
It may seem self-evident that wrong-termism is socially costly since 
its proponents would push firms off some ideal investment path. However, 
as this Article will describe, wrong-termism is not categorically 
inefficient; under some circumstances, it is a second-best solution to 
agency and liquidity problems. It may be the best an investor can do given 
constraints inherent in shareholder capitalism. 
This is not principally an article about whether wrong-termism is 
widespread or whether a given practice should be considered wrong-
termist. It is an empirical question whether investors do in fact fixate on 
particular time horizons, just as it is a question of fact whether this fixation 
actually affects corporate conduct and whether these changes actually 
affect investment efficiency or aggregate welfare. This Article does not 
stake a position as to the state of the empirical debate, nor are its 
conclusions dependent upon any particular state of affairs. 
Nor is this an article about whether putative wrong-termism is wrong 
as such. As will be seen, some instances of seeming wrong-termism may 
well yield important benefits. Rather than taking a categorical stand, the 
tools within this Article should help scholars to discern and describe 
whether a given instance of wrong-termism is in fact troublesome. 
Time horizons are sometimes code for urging corporate concern for 
non-shareholder constituencies, such as the public or the environment.4 
Long-termism can also be code for managerialism.5 While I understand 
the appeal of fighting about the nature and control of the corporation under 
the guise of shareholder time horizons, this Article tries to focus on the 
temporal problem. It will have implications for those other debates, but it 
is not written in order to accommodate a particular view on those other 
matters. 
I. THE SOURCES OF WRONG-TERMISM 
 
 What sources could give rise to wrong-termism? This Part 
describes the three plausible sources of wrong-termism. They are: facts 
                                                     
 4. E.g., A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 52 (1991) (“Concern with the welfare of 
employees, of communities, of suppliers, of customers is clearly in the interests of shareholders when 
they are deemed to have a long-term perspective . . . .”). 
 5. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 
45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 580 (1993). 
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about a given investor, beliefs about the relevant assets, and beliefs about 
other investors. If we observe a great deal of wrong-termism, it may be 
that individual investors have a generally wrong-termed outlook, or that 
investors reluctantly adopt wrong-termism because they believe that a 
particular asset requires it or that others want assets that have been 
managed for the wrong term.6 That is, the source can be real or perceived 
features of: (A) the investor, (B) the asset, or (C) the market. Each of these 
sources, in turn, come in both a rational and an irrational variety. 
These sources of wrong-termism can certainly coexist as 
contributing explanations for a given instance of wrong-termism. 
Furthermore, it may prove challenging to detect the relative contribution 
of these sources in general or in a given case. Importantly, the sources also 
exhibit a degree of interactivity.7 Still, it seems to me that these sources of 
wrong-termism are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive at a 
conceptual level. A marginal increase in wrong-termism can be, in 
principle, tracked back to a concomitant change in one of these sources of 
wrong-termism.8 
A. Investor 
The first source of wrong-termism I discuss is the investor, both 
rational and irrational. I begin with a discussion of individual investors and 
then consider institutional investors in three contexts: (1) mutual funds, 
(2) money market mutual funds, and (3) pension funds. 
Some children eat the marshmallow. Others wait patiently until their 
bounty doubles.9 And there may even be some children who so 
                                                     
 6. In a trivial sense, all investor conduct must find its explanation in facts about the investor since 
something in the investor must explain why this investor responded in that way given certain facts. 
Nevertheless, we can distinguish between investor conduct that is originally or distinctively born in 
the investor’s nature and that is external to the investor. This distinction matters in terms of clear 
thinking as well as identifying the channels for research and intervention. Investor-derived wrong-
termism might exhibit itself in many choices the investor makes, and curing it might result in temporal 
realignment across a number of investor choices. Externally derived wrong-termism may come into 
view for a given investor only under certain circumstances, which may be contingent upon 
interventions in the information and investment environment. If investors are wrong-termists because 
of their belief about a certain asset or trading environment, we might get a different result if the asset 
or its environment is changed. 
 7. See infra Parts III.A. and III.B. 
 8. Assuming no change in the solutions suite that might permit or block some expression of a 
constant cause of wrong-termism. 
 9. See generally Walter Mischel, Yuichi Shoda & Monica L. Rodriguzez, Delay of Gratification 
in Children, 244 SCI. 933 (1989) (showing that willingness to delay confectionary consumption 
predicts later SAT scores); Jacoba Urist, What the Marshmallow Test Really Teaches About Self-
Control, ATLANTIC (2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/09/what-the-
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assiduously guard their allotted candy that the treasure expires uneaten; 
their excessively patient disposition can be just as wasteful as its opposite. 
On one model of wrong-terming, investors suffer from 
marshmallow-like impatience (or the converse—excessive patience).10 
They demand quarterly earnings and dividends rather than long-term 
research and appreciation because they are dispositionally and irrationally 
impatient. It is dispositional because it is rooted in investors’ character 
rather than some feature of the outside world, and it is irrational because 
investors may ultimately regret this conduct. For example, if failure to 
invest for the long-term results in less long-term gain, the older versions 
of investors may wish that they had had more foresight in their youth. 
This model can draw support from certain behavioral economics 
research. Individual humans certainly do not make every choice in a 
temporally neutral and rational fashion.11 Rather, we often exhibit peculiar 
behaviors such as hyperbolic discounting: we would not accept a steep 
discount to have money in 100 days instead of 101, but we would accept a 
steep discount to have money in one day instead of two.12 We may 
discount similarly when acting as shareholders.13 
There is some hope that institutions can solve this problem: 
individual biases may be cancelled out by profit motives, institutional 
culture, or corporate de-biasing techniques.14 It does not follow from the 
fact that children impulsively gorge on marshmallows that investors 
impulsively gorge on quarterly earnings. 
Yet wrong-termism can also arise from institutional dynamics, 
particularly when we consider the rational branch of investor-born wrong-
                                                     
marshmallow-test-really-teaches-about-self-control/380673/ [https://perma.cc/5JCT-HQSY] 
(discussing the Stanford marshmallow experiment). 
 10. See, e.g., David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 
(2013) (arguing that shareholder short-termism is caused by the need to meet current obligations and 
compete for investment funds, the presence of independent investment advisors, and fiduciary 
obligations); see also Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial 
Myopia, 100 KY. L.J. 531 (2012). 
 11. On behavioral economics generally, see Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Law and Economics: 
Law, Policy and Science, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 5 (2013). 
 12. On hyperbolic discounting, see David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 
112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 445 (1997) (“Hyperbolic discount functions are characterized by a relatively high 
discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low discount rate over long horizons. This discount 
structure sets up a conflict between today’s preferences, and the preferences that will be held in the 
future.”). 
 13. See generally id. (modeling the behavior of hyperbolic discounting investors). 
 14. On the rational behavior of institutions, see Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save 
More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164 
(2004) (outlining a de-biasing technique in corporate retirement plans resulting in lower drop-out rates 
from savings programs and a tripling in savings rates—the technique mitigated the effects of loss 
aversion and the status quo biases). 
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termism. While the most commonly alleged versions of investor wrong-
termism are surely irrational, others are generally rational responses to an 
investor’s unique and pressing constraints. 
Sometimes, investors’ constraints arise from the life circumstances 
of the investor: a criminal defendant may prefer liquid investments 
because she prioritizes making a suitable bail payment; an employer may 
care most about asset values at the end of the month because that is when 
she must make payroll; and a stock picker may prefer earlier (if smaller) 
gains as a signal of her star potential.15 Other investors may fear 
reinvestment risk and cost and, thus, prefer later gains and realizations.16 
Yet other investors may expect hungry creditors—divorcing spouses or 
stern banks—to plague them for years; thus, early gains may be stripped 
away, making distant payoffs desirable even if superficially smaller in 
magnitude. 
Sometimes, the law plays a role in constructing investor time 
horizons and creating investor constraints. That was arguably true in the 
bail and payroll example above, in that the law insisted upon certain forms 
of liquidity at certain moments, but there are far more examples in the 
institutional investment space. Institutional investors, such as pension 
funds and mutual funds, now own some two-thirds of the investable 
market.17 These institutional investors face market and legal pressures that 
structure their time horizons: mutual fund managers are required to offer 
redemption to any investor on a few hours’ notice; money market funds 
can legally invest in only short-term instruments; and pension funds face 
fierce penalties if their assets mature out of sync with their liabilities. 
Given the magnitude of institutional investment, it is worthwhile to 
consider the pressures—institutional and legal—that may lead them to 
rational wrong-termism. 
                                                     
 15. See Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession, 61 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 65 (2005); see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency 
Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 89 (2017) (describing how investments 
in governance—presumably rational in the long run—are avoided by fund managers given their own 
inability to internalize those gains); see also Craig W. Holden & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Risk 
Aversion, Liquidity, and Endogenous Short Horizons, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 691 (1996). 
 16. Austin M. Long, III, Quantification of Reinvestment Risk in the Private Investment Portfolio, 
4 J. PRIV. EQUITY 70, 70 (2001) (defining reinvestment risk as “the risk that a distribution, when 
received and reinvested, will not achieve the returns expected upon the making of the original 
investment . . .”). 
          17. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE: 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, SECOND QUARTER 2017, 130 tbl. L.223 (2017) [here-
inafter FED. RES. STAT. RELEASE], https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/ 
z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP4P-QQMQ]. Of the $33,364.8 billion in equities, $12,744.4 billion are 
owned by households and the rest—about $20 trillion or sixty-one percent—are owned by institutions. 
Id. 
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1. Mutual Funds 
Mutual fund managers may have incentives to push issuers to 
generate and demonstrate gains in particular moments, generally moments 
near in time, in order to improve their own short-term compensation and 
accumulate customers over the medium term. 
Most mutual fund management companies are paid a fee based on 
the amount of assets under management; thus, the more customer funds, 
the more compensation.18 There is ample evidence that a fund’s customer 
growth depends on its ability to state past returns.19 It may be better for 
fund managers to reap an early harvest to signal quality (and so enjoy a 
large investor following for years to come) rather than to patiently nurture 
better, but later, opportunities. 
The preference for short-term over long-term time horizons is not a 
linear one, growing with immediacy. Sometimes, particular days (even if 
a little later in time) are more desirable for making a gain. A fund manager 
may be paid based on the value of funds under management, but this figure 
may be computed only at certain intervals, such as the last day of a given 
month or quarter.20 Such an investor prefers returns that materialize on 
those days even if greater gains might have been possible one day before 
or after. 
Even if fund managers don’t seek disproportionate gains on early or 
select days, they may wish to avoid outsize losses in those periods. Mutual 
funds are currently funded solely by a single class of equity securities,21 
which can be settled for net asset value (NAV) every day.22 Their potential 
liability operates on a 24-hour horizon. The ability of fund participants to 
fully liquidate their positions on any day makes managers conscious of the 
                                                     
 18. See Anne M. Tucker, The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & Corporate Alienation, 
11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 99, 127 (2013) (asserting that intermediary investment companies’ short-term 
time horizons “drive short termism at the operating company level, [intensifying] investment-time-
horizon conflict”). 
 19. David K. Musto, The Economics of Mutual Funds, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 159, 161 (2011) 
(stating that investors look to past performances to make investment decisions). 
 20. Cf. Mark Carhart, Ron Kaniel, David K. Musto & Adam V. Reed, Leaning for the Tape: 
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds, 57 J. FIN. 661 (2002) (stating that price 
changes at the end of certain days suggest manipulation by fund managers). 
 21. They face limitations on their asset mix and have limited ability to borrow; thus, they are 
limited in their asset and liquidity transfer options. See Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) 
§ 18(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (2012) (barring “senior securities”); ICA § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-2(a)(26) (2012) (defining securities as any “evidence of indebtedness”); ICA 18f-1, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.18f-1 (2017) (permitting a limited quantity of bank debt); ICA 18f-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-3 
(2017) (barring preferred stock). See generally John Morley, The Regulation of Mutual Fund Debt, 30 
YALE J. ON REG. 343 (2013) (describing the law on mutual fund capital structures). 
 22. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010) (explaining the dynamics of NAV). 
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day-to-day movement of invested assets. Managers may prefer that share 
prices remain stable to prevent rational or irrational sales by fund 
investors. 
2. Money Market Mutual Funds 
While ordinary mutual funds have flexible liability amounts,23 and 
so face less pressure to force their assets to conform to fixed liabilities, the 
same cannot be said of money market mutual funds.24 Money market 
mutual funds promise investors a stable NAV. An investor who buys 100 
units of a money market fund at $1 each is supposed to receive back $100 
when she comes to redeem her interest (perhaps having enjoyed some 
interest-like payments along the way).25 The safety and flexibility of 
money market funds have made them popular as bank deposit 
substitutes.26 But, it has come at a price. 
The promise to make investors whole, even if the market declines, 
amounts to a fixed liability claimable essentially on demand. Unlike an 
ordinary mutual fund, which must redeem investors at their pro rata share 
of NAV, money funds are permitted to redeem investors at par so long as 
it is reasonably close to NAV.27 In theory, an investor might claim $1 per 
share, even if the fund has lost money. Withdrawing more than NAV 
means that later withdrawals may be at less than NAV. The fact that some 
investors may grab $1 on a 99¢ investment creates a rational fear in other 
investors that they may later receive only 98¢. The option to receive $1 
even as the fund struggles creates an incentive to run on the fund. It is the 
resultant fragility of money funds, and the fragility they transmit to other 
                                                     
 23. Mutual fund liabilities to fund participants generally cannot exceed the fund’s assets because 
NAV, the redemption price of shares, adjusts to track the assets. That reduces the incentive of fund 
managers to demand portfolio companies avoid short-term losses (which, if the fund’s liabilities were 
fixed in magnitude, would put the fund in a fix, at least in the short term), but it does not eliminate it, 
in part for the reasons just discussed. Another reason is that a limited amount of debt is permitted for 
investment funds. 
 24. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in 
Money Market Fund Reform, 93 N.C. L. REV. 935 (2015) (explaining the mechanics and risks of 
money mutual funds). 
25 25. See Musto, supra note 19, at 164 (stating that money market mutual funds keep their price 
at $1 per share and maintain their portfolios to the short end on the yield curve). 
 26. See id. (stating that money market mutual funds are similar to banks in that they keep their 
price at $1 per share and their portfolios to the short end of the yield curve, making them a popular 
bank substitute). 
 27. Patrick E. McCabe et al., The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic 
Risks Posed by Money Market Funds, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2013, at 211, 
215. 
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actors in the system, which lately made money funds the subject of ample 
scholarship as potential sources of systemic risk.28 
Their fixed liabilities and risk of runs gives money market funds a 
fiercely short time horizon. This natural incentive is coupled with legal 
restrictions requiring the money market fund to invest only in peculiarly 
safe and liquid securities; the money fund must not find itself bearing the 
risk of a long-term prospect that is risky in the meantime.29 Money funds, 
therefore, seek out investments that are easy to liquidate or are self-
liquidating on a short-term basis and which are extremely unlikely to 
decline in value over any given time window.30 
In theory, money funds’ short time horizon might make them 
powerful advocates for short-term policies at companies, urging issuers to 
forgo long-term projects that might leave the issuer cash-strapped in the 
next few days. In practice, this problem does not arise because money 
funds exercise little governance oversight. Instead, they flee problematic 
issuers at the drop of a hat.31 Money funds exercise asset transfer (selling 
assets to other investors) and liquidity transfer (ceasing to lend to these 
issuers) rather than control. 
However, lack of control does not mean that money funds do not 
exert a wrong-term influence on companies. To the contrary, the fund’s 
demand for safe assets puts tremendous pressure on the system to produce 
assets that can be bought and abandoned in this way.32 Issuers receive a 
terrific cost of funds advantage if they can offer short-term instruments to 
money market funds. 
This creates a bevy of risks and incentives for issuers. Should they 
take long-term projects? Doing so exposes them to maturity mismatch—
with any decline in interest in debt they would face a funding shortfall until 
longer lived projects mature. Should they foreswear long-term projects? If 
so, valuable projects are avoided in deference to volatile liabilities. 
We are familiar with both choices from the financial crisis. Large 
investment banks came to rely almost exclusively on overnight and short-
term unsecured borrowing to finance operations that obviously had longer 
arcs and greater risks than their creditors would have accepted. Once short-
                                                     
 28. See Mark Perlow, Money Market Funds—Preserving Systemic Benefits, Minimizing Systemic 
Risk, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 74 (2011). See generally Hilary J. Allen, Money Market Fund Reform 
Viewed Through a Systemic Risk Lens, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 87 (2010).  
29. See Allen, supra note 28, at 89–92. 
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennacchi, Security Baskets and Index-Linked 
Securities, 66 J. BUS. 1 (1993).        
32. See Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3068991.  
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term credit became uncertain, these institutions faced risks to manage 
themselves and their investments in ways that would soothe or placate 
their short-term creditors, even if it meant sacrificing long-term franchise 
value or accumulating substantial long-term liabilities.33 
3. Pension Funds 
Not all wrong-term investors are clearly short-term investors. 
Consider another important category of time constrained investor: 
federally regulated defined benefit pension funds. Pension funds control 
about $18 trillion in assets,34 of which approximately half are for the 
benefit of private sector workers.35 More than $3 trillion are allotted to 
private defined benefit pension plans.36 
Pension funds exist to provide a dependable retirement income or 
benefits package for retirees. Pension fund managers must carefully 
manage their investment program because their liabilities are largely fixed. 
Within reason, fund managers know exactly what they will owe and 
when.37 A fund may know that it will begin making substantial payments 
starting in five years and terminating in fifteen years. 
The predictable nature of pension fund liabilities creates a potent 
incentive for wrong-terming. An investment that pays a great deal but 
matures only after thirty years will be of little interest to the fund, at least 
by itself. The fund must make all of its payments long before the 
investment matures, and so the fund may pressure firms to undertake 
projects with shorter repayment cycles. 
Of course, it is easy to imagine how a thirty-year project may still be 
financed. If the associated investment asset is liquid and riskless, then a 
fund could sell it at year fifteen, perhaps even to another pension fund. 
Likewise, if the fund can readily borrow, then the fund could pay its 
liabilities with debt and eventually repay the loan with the investment. 
Thus, there are some alternatives to tailoring investment maturity to fund 
time horizon. 
                                                     
 33. For example, manipulating Libor was a fine way to generate extra revenue in the short term, 
but it resulted in billions of dollars of fines, as well as an end to the banks’ valuable control over the 
rate. See generally Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and 
Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2013). 
 34. FED. RES. STAT. RELEASE, supra note 17, at 94 tbl. L.117. 
 35. Id. at 95 tbl. L.118.  
 36. Id.; see Michael J. Cohen, Questioning How the Bankruptcy Priority Scheme Treats Tax 
Claims Arising from the Termination of Overfunded Pension Plans, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2443 
(2002) (defining “defined benefit” plan with regard to Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA)). 
 37. Of course, there are many ways in which these actuarial expectations may prove wrong; we 
live longer than we used to. 
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Still, the penalties for failing to meet pension obligations are severe.38 
There is a huge downside risk for underfunding. If the investment is not 
perfectly riskless and liquid, the fund could find itself without the ability 
to make payments at the appointed time. 
Moreover, the payoff from accepting a time horizon risk is limited 
because the law imposes penalties for overfunding pensions. A fifty 
percent excise tax is applied on top of the standard corporate rate if excess 
assets revert to the plan sponsor at termination.39 If you put more money 
into a pension than proves necessary or generate more investment gains 
than you end up needing, you may lose much of the balance.40 The reason 
for the excise tax is to discourage corporate raiders from pillaging pension 
funds. However, a byproduct of the excise tax is that it blunts a fund 
sponsor’s incentives to find the best overall investment, and it 
proportionately increases the incentive to simply pick an investment that 
fits its own investment horizon or forces existing investments to conform 
to that horizon. Right-termed investments may have better expected 
returns, but pensions do not fully internalize this improved return. 
Wrong-termism may therefore dominate pension fund investment 
strategy. This is certainly the outlook that many pension fund 
commentators endorse. For example, Michael W. Peskin, former head of 
Morgan Stanley’s pension advisory group, argued that “a public pension 
plan’s proper objective should be to provide intended benefits at the lowest 
cost.”41 Investment composition should be “[v]irtually dictated by nature 
of liabilities and funded status.”42 Other considerations such as risk-
adjusted return, “[m]inimi[zing] cost per unit of volatility of 
                                                     
 38. Along the way, taxes are imposed on plan sponsors who fail to adequately provision for 
future liabilities. The excise tax is ten percent of the underfunding plus an additional 100% if the 
deficit is not corrected within a specified time period. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 302(a)(2), 412(a), 4971 
(2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2) (2012). It is a violation of the duty of prudence for an investment 
manager to fail to take the recipient’s liquidity needs into account in investing. See GIW Indus. v. 
Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 39. I.R.C. § 4980 (2012). See generally Christopher G. Guldberg, The Sale of Overfunded 
Pension Plans and Indirect Reversions, 32 J. CORP. TAX’N 40, 40 (2005). The excise tax drops to only 
twenty percent if the employer devotes the surplus to a “qualified replacement plan.” I.R.C. § 4980(d) 
(defining such plans). This excise tax emerged in response to the perceived tendency of acquirers 
pillaging over-funded pension plans of target companies. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, 
and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1543 (1997) (describing concerns about these 
pension reversions). In addition, no reversion of excess funds may be paid, taxed or otherwise, until 
all employee and beneficiary liabilities have been satisfied. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) (2012). 
 40. Plan sponsors could just distribute the surplus to plan beneficiaries, but this would amount 
to getting nothing back of the excess. A fifty percent excise tax will seem better in a great many 
situations. 
 41. Michael Peskin, Asset/Liability Management in the Public Sector, in PENSIONS IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 195, 195 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds., 2001). 
42. Id. at 196.   
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cost[,] . . . [or] overall peer group comparison [are] not relevant.”43 With 
such a temporally defined investment plan, pension funds are candidates 
for investor-born wrong-termism.44 
B. Asset 
A second source of wrong-termism, asset- or investment-born 
wrong-termism, is that which is explained in terms of facts about particular 
issuers. For example, investors may rightly or wrongly believe that the 
best way to gain from certain assets is to insist that managers of those 
assets focus their attention on short-term objectives—regardless of 
whether other investments deserve similar treatment and regardless of the 
investor’s own appetite for returns. Asset wrong-termism is, therefore, 
born of an instrumental and empirical belief about how temporal bounding 
can improve overall performance. 
Some versions of apparent wrong-termism have enjoyed widespread 
support at times as solutions to asset-related problems. For example, it is 
common to support firm debt incurrence (often in connection with 
dividend payments) because the need to meet periodic interest payments 
can discipline managers by forcing them to attend to short-term cash flow, 
which helps reduce wasteful and lackadaisical conduct, even though it may 
reduce their ability to grow and take all worthwhile investments.45 
                                                     
43. Id. 
 44. The fact that this is advised does not guarantee that it is followed. Munnell and Soto found 
that the share of S&L plan assets in equities has grown in parallel with private sector share—from 
forty percent in the 1980s to seventy percent in 2007. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & MAURICIO SOTO, CTR. 
FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM PRIVATE 
PLANS 5 (Nov. 2007), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d2ce/c4f37453bee2aa89a6c2a166e7c748d6b6 
dd.pdf [https://perma.cc/G63V-HUMK]. This led to a loss of $1 trillion of state and local defined 
benefit equity assets from 2007 to 2008. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH 
AT BOS. COLL., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND STATE/LOCAL DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 1 (Nov. 2008), 
https://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:104316/datastream/ 
PDF/view [https://perma.cc/KC7Z-M6GG]. Perhaps more importantly, we are all aware that many 
pension funds—particularly state and local government pensions—are underfunded, suggesting little 
regard for the time structure of their liabilities. See generally Natalya Shnitser, Funding Discipline for 
U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design, 100 IOWA L. REV. 663 
(2015) (analyzing key determinants of underfunding). 
 45. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial 
Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (John J. McCall ed., 1982) 
(integrating elements from agency, property rights, and finance to explain firm ownership structure); 
Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and 
Manager-Shareholder Congruence, 109 Q.J. ECON. 1027 (1994) (presenting a theory of capital 
structure of firms that complements incentive schemes to discipline managers); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital, 109 Q.J. ECON. 841 (1994) 
(characterizing the optimal repayment path and showing how it is affected both by the maturity 
structure of the project return stream and by the durability and specificity of project assets); Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
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Another instance of wrong-termism supported by reference to the 
asset concerns research and development (R&D) spending. Firms may 
pursue short-term projects rather than long-term R&D investments if their 
investors find it costly to verify the benefits of the R&D.46 Similar ideas 
have been advanced for whole categories of short-term behavior.47 
Whether any of the forgoing practices actually serve the interests of 
investors is the subject of intense debate, so it is difficult to brand any of 
them as clearly rational or irrational. Obviously, efforts to marshal 
resources through short-horizon cash realization can be unwise. For 
example, consider one proposal that has not found widespread support in 
the United States yet is actually law in five nations: mandatory payment 
of substantial annual dividends.48 
Dividend payments in the United States are, for the most part, 
discretionary and subject to the board’s consideration.49 One rationale for 
this is that dividend payments are sometimes not the wisest strategy for a 
firm. After making a dividend payment, a cash-constrained firm may find 
itself unable to pursue a profitable business opportunity.50 The real cost 
may be substantial and outweigh whatever benefits come from regular 
dividend payments. 
Nevertheless, several nations have determined that this mandatory 
rule is appropriate and implemented it.51 We might characterize this as a 
practice—backed by a rule—reflecting an irrational belief about issuers, 
at least in many contexts: issuers are so likely to squander idle cash that it 
is best to return it to shareholders now, even in the face of excellent 
middle-term investment opportunities.52 
                                                     
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See generally Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of 
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (explaining the 
role of debt in motivating organizational efficiency). 
 46. See generally Ricky W. Scott, Do Institutional Investors Influence R&D Investment Policy 
in Firms with High Information Asymmetry?, 7 INT’L BUS. RES. 22 (2014) (showing how retail 
investor ownership discourages R&D in firms with high information asymmetry). 
 47. See generally Richard T. Thakor, A Theory of Efficient Short Termism (Aug. 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821162 (arguing that short-term projects can 
limit managerial rent-seeking). 
 48. The five countries are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela. Theo Cotrim 
Martins & Walter Novaes, Mandatory Dividend Rules: Do They Make It Harder for Firms to Invest?, 
18 J. CORP. FIN. 953, 953 (2012). 
 49. See Kamin v. Amex, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
 50. Even if outside financing is available, financing from existing cash flows can often be the 
cheapest approach. 
 51. Martins & Novaes, supra note 48. 
 52. In Brazilian firms, Martins and Novaes find no evidence of reduced investment activity. Id. 
at 954. Presumably, this is because much of this dividend amount would actually have not gone to 
finance investments; the civil law countries that have adopted this rule may have been prone to 
excessive tunneling of profits. La Porta et al. have hypothesized that low dividends in these 
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C. Market 
The third source of wrong-termism is the market. An investor may 
neither have a specific view about the benefits of short-termism in 
managing a certain asset class nor have an inborn short-term 
outlook; yet, the investor may still take a short-term perspective on things 
if she believes that secondary markets reward a short investment fuse. For 
example, if all other investors believe that short-termism helps to drive 
efficient investment, or all other investors are temperamentally myopic, it 
might pay to serve up short-term investment opportunities to those other 
investors. You can accommodate their disciplinary or temperamentally 
short-term outlook by acting as though you have a short-term perspective 
yourself. 
Some market-born short-termists may be opportunistic in the 
extreme, cynically taking advantage of secondary market behavior that 
they consider irrational. For example, Cremers et al. describe, and purport 
to document, that activist investors profit from short-term strategies.53 In 
particular, they argue that these firms take a position, advocate for changes 
that are likely to disrupt long-term value, but sell before that effect is 
observed.54 The activists enjoy frequent and small spikes of value, which 
are more than paid for by investors too foolish or myopic to discount the 
price they will pay for such shares.55 
Others may consider themselves reluctant victims in short-termism. 
Recall Keynes’s quip on these points: “The market can stay irrational 
longer than you can stay solvent.”56 Sometimes, the only way to stay afloat 
may be to swim in a school with the other fishes. 
Or, sometimes, it may only seem like the market overpays for wrong-
termed assets; instead, some market-born short-termism may be unwise 
and unprofitable. Investors may attribute short-termism to others that are 
simply not there. They may think that they are playing Keynes’s beauty 
contest when the market is actually driven by fundamentals. This 
sentiment is certainly the refrain from the main line of corporate law that 
current share prices sufficiently reflect long-term cash flows and that only 
                                                     
jurisdictions work to disadvantage minority investors. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Agency 
Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000). Mandatory dividends might 
indeed be a rational technique to control majority shareholder extractions in those jurisdictions. 
Presumably, such a rule would be less justified in a jurisdiction like the United States, where 
controlling shareholder extractions are constrained by numerous other forces. 
 53. K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value 5–7 (Dec. 14, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231. 
54. Id.  
55. Id.  
56. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 123 (2000) (attributing this quotation to Keynes).  
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fools would think they can make money by pillaging long-term 
investments and flipping them to a myopic public.57 
While it is always hard to determine what was rational when and for 
whom, we can generate plausible examples of this sort too. Consider the 
Home of the Whopper, Burger King.58 Burger King has been under 
constant managerial and ownership turnover.59 The company has had 
thirteen CEOs in twenty-five years.60 It has been under the private 
management of several firms in that period, brought to public markets 
twice, and taken private again.61 Burger King was owned by Pillsbury, 
Grand Metropolitan, Diageo, Bain Capital, TPG, and 3G Capital.62 At each 
stage, its cash has been pared off for fees and its business restructured to 
                                                     
 57. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 23–24 (8th ed. 2006) (stating that positive net present value projects increase 
value to the firm); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 884 (2005) (“[C]onsider[ing] the potential costs that might be caused by 
shareholders with short horizons, such as institutional investors and traders that follow high-turnover 
strategies . . . [, i]t is far from clear that the governance provisions favored by such shareholders would 
commonly deviate from those favored by long-term shareholders. If a governance arrangement is 
widely viewed as detrimental to long-term share value, its long-run effect will likely be reflected in 
the company’s stock price when the arrangement is adopted, and thus the short-run effect of its 
adoption will likely be negative as well.”); Joseph P. Farano, How Much Is Too Much? Director Equity 
Ownership and Its Role in the Independence Assessment, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 753, 774–75 (2008) 
(“With all projects—regardless of duration—priced into the present value of the entity, rational 
directors should not take a short-term view, even if their motives are purely financial and short-term, 
because capital markets will discount the present market value of a firm based on a project’s long-
term effect on the value of the company. Therefore, short-term decisions will be discounted in the 
present stock price, thwarting the ability to make quick changes and ‘cut and run’ with a short-term 
gain.”). If stock prices are accurate, then time horizon problems can be solved simply by linking 
manager pay to stock prices. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1495 (1989) (“Since growth ultimately raised the 
level of dividend return, it manifested itself in present capital appreciation, that is, a higher stock price. 
Thus, long-term industrial stability and short-term profit came into balance, or so it seemed.”); William 
J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency 
Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 416–17 (1988) (“Option plans have the particular advantage of 
including rewards for expected long-term increases in investor wealth, because stock prices reflect the 
entire future stream of expected payments to shareholders, discounted to present value. These 
payments also solve the time horizon problem, where managers expect to be in their current position 
for only a relatively brief span.”). But see WILLIAM W. BRATTON & JOSEPH 
MCCAHERY, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, 
ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 742 (2015) (“[M]aximizing the corporation’s fundamental value and 
maximizing its stock price can amount to distinct objectives in the presence of information 
asymmetries.”). 
 58. Joe Nocera, Burger King, the Cash Cow, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/nocera-burger-king-the-cash-cow.html. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. 
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make the next flip more attractive.63 One result of these transactions is that 
Burger King has lagged behind competitors such as McDonalds,64 which 
may have devoted more resources to expanding and improving their 
businesses. While it is possible that all of these moves were rational for 
each player, we might also think that someone on the chain misunderstood 
what the market wanted and reoriented the business to suit the perceived 
myopia of buyers who would have actually preferred a business on firm 
footing instead. 
The following figure summarizes the taxonomy of wrong-termism. 
 
Sources of Wrong-Termism 
Investor Asset Market 
Rational Irrational Rational Irrational Rational Irrational 
Idiosyncratic 
liquidity 
profile, legal 
constraints, 
institutional 
dynamics 
(e.g., 
pension 
fund) 
Myopia  
(e.g., 
Twitchy 
preference 
for dividends 
over 
ordinary 
maintenance)
Second-
best effort  
to constrain 
agency 
costs  
(e.g., 
disciplining 
effect  
of debt) 
Excessive 
doubt 
about 
future-
oriented  
investment. 
(e.g.,  
mandatory 
dividends  
in U.S.) 
Pump 
and 
Dump 
Activism 
(e.g., the 
sort 
described 
by 
Cremers 
& Sepe) 
Sacrificing 
business  
fundamentals 
to meet 
perceived  
demand  
(e.g., Burger 
King Serial 
IPO) 
 
II. RESPONSES TO WRONG-TERMISM 
Just as we have charted the sources for wrong-termism’s troubled 
waters, we can also map the turns that scholars and policy makers can take 
to best respond. Here, I highlight two important categories of policy 
response: altering shareholder power and facilitating certain market 
transactions (or “portfolio” responses). It is fair to say that the wrong-
termism debate has mostly considered the former in recent years. 
Faith in the power of markets to solve wrong-termism has led many 
to doubt the existence of wrong-termism.65 To put it another way, some 
are confident that we have already pursued the market solution to wrong-
termism. Yet, there is less talk about how any remaining wrong-termism 
might be affected by marginal increases in market efficiency. Indeed, the 
main point of this Part is to highlight some forgotten or unconsidered ways 
                                                     
63. Id.  
64. Id. 
 65. Cf. Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2011) 
(considering whether short-termism will be eliminated in an efficient market). 
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in which the market can help solve wrong-termism without altering 
shareholder power dynamics, which are then developed in Part III. 
Adjustments to investor power and portfolio are certainly not the 
only two categories of responses to wrong-termism. One important 
category of response concerns research and dissemination of knowledge. 
If our best social science reports that certain governance patterns lead to 
inefficient telescoping of investment horizons, those patterns may become 
less popular with their supposed beneficiaries. Shareholders may clamber 
less (or more) for quarterly earnings if they are persuaded by conferences 
such as these that quarterly capitalism hurts them (or the other way 
around). There is surely a place for research and reason, as well as coercion 
and market lubrication. 
A. Power 
To the degree that investors are wrong-termists, they may use their 
leverage over company managers to demand wrong-term investment. If 
we are confident that this occurs and is inefficient, one strategy may be to 
limit investor influence in a variety of ways. Then managers will have the 
freedom to pursue optimal investment strategies, whatever their duration. 
For those convinced of shareholder wrong-termism, a plethora of 
practices and legal interventions have been praised for their diminution of 
shareholder influence. Staggered boards are now back in fashion as ways 
to preserve board continuity and delay hostile changes of board 
composition.66 So are poison pills, which are legal technologies that punish 
uninvited acquirers.67 To combat coordinated campaigns of activist hedge 
funds (i.e., “wolf packs”), some scholars would toughen up the Williams 
Act68 and tighten insider trading laws.69 Unsurprisingly, those doubtful of 
the existence of harmful wrong-termism have resisted these interventions 
and urged the opposite.70 
While investor-power modifications are a highly salient domain for 
addressing wrong-termism, it is a potentially costly area for intervention. 
                                                     
 66. See Martijn Cremers et al., The Value of Takeover Defenses: Evidence from Exogenous 
Shocks to Closed-End Mutual Funds 18 (Jan. 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship. 
law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=law_econ. 
 67. See generally id.  
 68. Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 2, at 595–98 (arguing that the Section 13(d)(1) disclosure 
window should be closed or shortened and that 13D filings should be more liberally required for 
arguable members of the activist “group”). 
 69. Id. at 598–600 (arguing for more expansive Rule 14e-3 restrictions). 
 70. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of 
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012) (arguing against rules antagonistic to hedge 
fund activism). 
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First, managers may also suffer from wrong-termism. In that case, the 
balance of power between investors and managers may involve balancing 
their offsetting wrong-termisms rather than protecting right-termism.71 
Second, efforts to limit shareholder power leave managers unconstrained, 
aggravating traditional agency problems familiar to readers of Berle, 
Means, Jensen, and others. This may be a price worth paying, but it would 
be better not to pay it at all. 
Are there solutions to wrong-termism other than a referendum on 
managerialism? The next suite of solutions offers the promise of Pareto 
improvements: if voluntary market transactions can reduce wrong-
termism, there may be solutions with few victims. 
B. Portfolio 
If investors demand returns on the wrong term, their different 
investment rhythms can be reconciled with that of their investments by 
changing the investor’s portfolio composition. The idea that liquid markets 
can solve horizon problems is comforting and familiar. For example, Larry 
Cunningham recently wrote,  
 
Shareholders may be arrayed on a highly delineated range 
of time horizons, from minute-to-minute short-term day 
traders fastened on price fluctuations to long-term 
devotees of fundamental value. The populations may vary 
with different corporations and economic climates. With 
efficient markets, this short-term-long-term dichotomy 
would not exist.72  
 
It is true that markets are not perfectly efficient, but perhaps they are 
already efficient enough to help, and perhaps we can improve their 
efficiency in order to further solve wrong-termism. If various kinds of 
market-based reshuffling can be achieved, then investor time horizon 
problems may be laundered through better matching. 
One solution, which we can call “liquidity transfer,” involves 
intertemporal swapping of cash. Wrong-term investors can be appeased by 
granting them cash in their preferred period, financed by less consumption 
                                                     
 71. See Michal Barzuza & Eric L. Talley, Short-Termism and Long-Termism 9–10 (Va. Law and 
Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 2016; Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2731814, 
2016; Columbia Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 14-503, 2016; Columbia Law and Econ., Working 
Paper No. 526, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731814. 
 72. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive Pay: Contractual 
Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1188 (2011). 
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in another period rather than hasty or slothful portfolio company 
investment. 
A second solution we can call “asset transfer.” Asset transfer 
involves wrong-term investors selling their entitlements to temporally 
neutral investors so that the wrong-termer can buy assets that naturally 
mature at their preferred time.73 
A third portfolio solution refuses to take investor time horizons as a 
given, instead seeking to exploit the plasticity of investor time horizons. 
When the horizon is driven by particular liabilities, we can solve the 
horizon problem by alienating or quenching those liabilities. This 
approach, which is rarely considered, we can call “liability transfer.” 
To put this response into the metaphor of the best time for harvest, 
the previous section considered restraining impatient farmers to prevent 
early (or late) harvest. This Section contemplates farmers buying imported 
food on credit (liquidity transfer) to have something to eat until their own 
crops are ready; trading their farms for the farms of others, which are 
already in full bloom (asset transfer); or, most peculiarly, swapping 
appetites with others (liability transfer). 
1. Liquidity Transfer 
The earliest and most elegant response to wrong-termism in the 
finance literature comes from Irving Fisher in the form of his Separation 
Theorem.74 Fisher sought to prove that wrong-termism is not a problem in 
efficient markets because firms are able to separate their internal business 
or investment decisions from their outward-facing financing decisions.75 
Any wrong-termism among investors should not influence firm conduct 
because the maximizing strategy for each investor (long- and short-term 
alike) is to demand the wealth maximizing corporate strategy. Although 
Fisher’s Separation Theorem is well-known in the finance literature, and 
it was once a mainstay in legal theory,76 it has been seldom mentioned in 
                                                     
 73. The counter party may also be prone to wrong-termism, so long as it is offsetting and opposite 
in its direction. 
 74. Fisher presented this idea in various forms in several books. See generally IRVING FISHER, 
THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906) [hereinafter FISHER I]; IRVING FISHER, RATE OF 
INTEREST: ITS NATURE, DETERMINATION AND RELATION TO ECONOMIC PHENOMENA (1907) 
[hereinafter FISHER II]; IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST AS DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE 
TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT (1930) [hereinafter FISHER III]. 
         75. See generally FISHER III, supra note 74. 
 76. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and 
Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 325 (1986) (applying Separation 
Theorem to caution against hasty application of behavioral insights to corporate law). 
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the last forty years in law review articles.77 So it bears repeating the 
essence of Fisher’s argument. 
Imagine two wrong-term investors: one investor (“Grasshopper”) 
would like a large payout as soon as possible, and another (“Ant”) would 
like to defer any gains for as long as possible. Imagine that they are both 
shareholders in a manufacturing company that would operate most 
efficiently if it retained some of its profits for the business’s future 
planning (to the consternation of impatient Grasshopper), but could not 
efficiently use all its cash in this way. To put numbers on these things, we 
can imagine that Hive, Inc. has $100 on hand, and that Hive can earn a 
risk-free twenty-five percent return on up to $60 reinvested from period 1 
to period 2, in a world where the prevailing interest rate is only ten percent. 
If the investors were silent, we can imagine Hive’s management paying 
$40 dividend in period 1, reinvesting $60, and then paying out $75 in 
period 2. But we may fear that short-term Grasshopper wants an 
immediate $100 dividend and that long-term Ant might demand that the 
factory somehow accept excessive investment order to accommodate 
additional funds. 
Fisher showed that there is no need for investors to clamor for their 
preferred return period, nor for firms to capitulate to those demands, so 
long as credit-markets are efficient.78 If Hive can borrow at the prevailing 
rate, it can summon up some money for Grasshopper without curtailing 
investments. Hive can borrow $60 in period 1 in order to have $100 ready 
for a dividend ($60 in borrowed money and $40 in the form of the dividend 
already natural for payment). Hive will then still get to invest $60 in the 
business as planned. In period 2, Hive will owe $66 (the principal, plus $6 
interest at the prevailing ten percent rate), which it can repay from the $75 
yielded by the investment. The $11 leftover is Grasshopper’s reward for 
being impatient in the right way. Alternatively, we could in fact zero out 
second period payments by having the firm borrow not $60 but $69.18 in 
the first period.79 Then Hive could pay Grasshopper a dividend of $109.18 
in the first period and nothing in the second period. Again, Grasshopper is 
much better off for allowing the firm to separate his impatience from the 
firm’s investment decisions. Likewise, Hive could accommodate Ant’s 
hypobolic discounting by reinvesting all her first period dividend at the 
                                                     
 77. One recent article extensively utilized the Separation Theorem. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, 
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 373, 381–82, 383–
86 (2009) (discussing Separation Theorem as part of the package of neoclassical corporate thought); 
See generally Daniel F. Spulber, Discovering the Role of The Firm: The Separation Criterion and 
Corporate Law, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 292 (2009). 
78. See FISHER III, supra note 74.  
79. $69.18 * 1.1 = $75. $69.18 is the number that grows to $75 at the promised rate of return. 
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prevailing rate of interest.80 Thus, her first period $40 dividend will grow 
to $44 by the second period. There is no need for Hive to force uneconomic 
investments in the factory to accommodate the extra cash. Ant will get 
$119 ($75 + $44) in the second period. 
Not only can Hive ignore its investors’ time preferences so long as it 
can borrow and lend freely, but the same result obtains if those investors 
can themselves borrow and lend freely. When impatient Grasshopper 
wants $100 (or $110) right now, he can immediately borrow the $60 (or 
$69.18) necessary to combine with the $40 dividend. He will owe $66 (or 
$75) later, which he can pay from his share of the period 2 $75 dividend. 
Likewise, Ant can reinvest her unwanted period 1 $40 dividend at the 
prevailing rate, and compound a $44 gain on top of her period 2 dividend. 
If capital markets are perfect, then investors can have optimal liquidity in 
all periods and never need to push firms to alter their optimal investment 
horizons. 
Of course, liquidity transfer is not costless, and credit markets are not 
perfect. Many individuals face inferior credit opportunities relative to 
firms and relative to one another. It is not risk-free to lend. Essentially no 
one can borrow at the same rate at which they lend. Almost all borrowers 
have hard constraints on their borrowing capacity, and those limits are 
often quite low. Still, liquidity transfer obviously plays some theoretical 
role in solving the wrong-termism problem, at least on some conceptions 
of the problem. 
2. Asset Transfer 
Even if credit-markets are imperfect, other aspects of the market, 
such as asset transfers, could help us overcome wrong-termism. If wrong-
term investors can liberally buy and sell assets, then they can alienate 
mismatched assets to investors better suited to owning them, and they can 
accordingly buy assets befitting their own time horizon. An impatient 
investor can sell a long-term asset in exchange for a mature or liquidating 
dividend payer. The buyer may be right-termed or wrong-termed on the 
other side, and will in any case value the long-term option more highly. 
The smart myopic investor sells too early rather than squeezing out early 
harvests. 
Adolf Berle’s own writings finely display this asset transfer cure to 
the problem of horizon diversity: 
 
                                                     
80. See David Eil, Hypobolic Discounting and Willingness-to-Wait (George Mason Univ. 
Interdisciplinary Ctr. For Econ. Sci., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 12-28, 2012), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2087098 (defining “hypobolic” discounting as the opposite of hyperbolic 
discounting). 
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In older times, probably, investments were conditioned by the 
needs of the investor. He made his loan or his investment with 
some eye to the time when he might need to withdraw it for more 
personal use, as to provide for his old age, to set up his son in 
business, or the like. Modern business precludes in large measure 
even the possibility of such arrangements. Capital once invested 
in a railroad or a steel plant cannot be subject to withdrawal; only 
in limited measure can it be the subject of refinancing operations-
paying out one group of investors with the contributions of 
another group. . . . This economic fact would alone account for the 
necessity of maintaining a market. 81 
 
Berle argues for the importance of laws against market manipulation 
as partial redemption of the world of horizon-driven investment. With a 
vibrant secondary market for securities, even short-term investors can 
make capital investments of unlimited duration. Manipulation must be 
stopped because secondary markets can only do their work in horizon-
proofing our investments if they are robust enough for investors of all 
horizons to trust in them. 
Of course, the market is not perfect. There is market manipulation. 
And even without such predation, there are transaction costs in selling or 
buying any stock. Those costs can be very high for certain illiquid 
securities, such as shares in closely held family businesses or almost any 
bonds. 
The law also imposes some limits to asset transfer. Investors who 
own 10% of a publicly traded company are deemed insiders for the 
purposes of the Williams Act.82 Such investors are subject to Section 16(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires disgorgement of 
short-swing profits.83 It effectively blocks the rapid sale and purchase of 
large blocks of securities. 
                                                     
 81. A. A. Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 266 
(1931). A footnote from the first sentence goes on: 
This is still true of the small real estate mortgage. Where granted by an 
individual investor or by a mortgage company or bank, the mortgage is made 
to mature when the lender believes either that he will need the money or that he 
will be able to find more profitable use for it. Aside from this form of 
investment, the theory that an investment can be withdrawn to meet some need 
of the investor seems to have been rather definitely discarded. This is as true of 
the long-term bond as it is of the stock.  
Id. at n.4. 
82. Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-439, 82 Stat. 455 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C., including §§ 13(d), 13(e), 13(g), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(f)). 
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). 
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3. Liability Transfer 
As did Berle, we often assume that our liabilities are fixed and given. 
But investors can choose to restructure their liabilities in light of their 
investment possibilities. If an investment’s optimal time horizon is longer 
than an investor’s endowed liabilities, the investor might be wiser to defer 
their liabilities than to pluck the investment early. Individuals can alter the 
timing of their liabilities in order to give themselves a time horizon that is 
suitable for their lending and investing opportunities. This 
commonsensical strategy is not well developed in the scholarly literature, 
nor is the law well-attuned to supporting it. 
In fact, individuals alter their liability terms structure all the time. 
Someone who knows that their lifetime income will be paid out mostly in 
the later years of their life might try to align their liabilities to that asset 
time horizon: they might take out a longer mortgage and then frequently 
refinance to keep the leverage high.84 This is frequently a much more 
logical strategy than trying to alter the asset side of their portfolio. When 
an individual’s portfolio is mostly expected job income, asset-side 
alterations are risky and costly; they involve choices like changing careers 
to paths with higher early salaries (and lower terminal salaries). It is 
probably better to move the liability. 
Borrowing or repaying debts is not the only way to alter our liability 
structure. All of us will need to spend money for health care, but a healthy 
diet and abstention from extreme sports can probabilistically move those 
liabilities later in time. Given the expense of severe health interventions, 
it makes sense to try to not only lower the expected liability but also to 
move it to a time when it can be managed. There may be a reason that 
people skydive after their company IPO rather than before. Apart from the 
feeling of celebration, a subtle reinforcing factor is that it is nice for the 
liability to come after the asset matures and that it was more logical to 
move the liability than to move the asset (say, by prematurely selling the 
company). 
When liabilities cannot be moved through time, they can be moved 
from person to person. If there is some reason that a mountain must be 
climbed today, I can pay another to pursue the adventure and bear the risk. 
The division of labor also involves transfers of concrete and potential 
risks. Indeed, the whole insurance industry is a form of liability transfer: 
the best payers of an uncertain risk may be an institution or pool, so it is 
efficient to transfer the liability to a better bearer. 
                                                     
 84. This example is clearly also an example of liquidity transfer. All three types in this sub-
section are part of the broader category of portfolio alteration, and there is not always an analytically 
sharp distinction between liquidity, asset, and liability transfer; a change in assets can be a change in 
liquidity, just as assets are largely just negative liabilities. 
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III. CONSIDERING RESPONSES AND SOURCES TOGETHER 
This Part considers the normative appropriateness of the various 
responses to the potential sources of wrong-termism. It also describes the 
interaction among sources and solutions. One conclusion from this Part is 
that easy answers are not always available within the confines of the 
existing debate. What helps with one form of wrong-termism may 
exacerbate another, and that means that many solutions involve tradeoffs. 
While careful empirical work could help us to make these tradeoffs wisely, 
we would do well to consider less-used solutions, where low-hanging fruit 
may yet be found. In particular, almost no attention has been given to 
liability transfer as part of the solution to wrong-termism. While there are 
risks and challenges to encouraging liability transfer, improved liability 
transfer poses little chance of exacerbating wrong-termism, regardless of 
the source of the wrong-termism. It is therefore worthy of greater study. 
A. Interaction among Sources of Wrong-Termism 
The three sources (investor, assets, and market) interact because the 
influence of any one source may be amplified by the presence of the others. 
Investor-based wrong-termism, which concerns an investor’s 
idiosyncratic desire to guide returns to a particular temporal point, is 
unlikely to be expressed in any great quantity if the asset and market 
sources are absent. The investor may need returns at a given moment in 
time, but she may not choose to impose those horizons on her investment 
company if she perceives that the market is willing to pay a great deal for 
the assets as they are currently being managed. Conversely, the investor 
may find validation in her wrong-termism if secondary markets signal that 
the wrong-termism is profitable. Likewise, an investor with short-term 
needs may be encouraged or cautioned if she forms asset-specific beliefs 
about whether short-term policies will improve or harm this particular 
investment. 
Therefore, these sources are not only substitutes but also, at some 
margin, complements. Figure 1 depicts a stylized version of this 
relationship, showing the total wrong-termism. As the sources of wrong-
termism rise, we can expect wrong-termism to rise, but probably not 
linearly.  
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Figure 1: Total Wrong-Terming as a Function of Source 
B. Effects of Certain Responses to Certain Sources 
While the three sources of wrong-termism generally support one 
another, the same cannot be said of solutions. The various solutions to 
wrong-termism (e.g., shareholder power or portfolio adjustment) interact 
in more complex ways, and not each response is appropriate to every sort 
of wrong-termism. 
Taken alone, the rationality of asset-based wrong-termism influences 
the appropriateness of shareholder empowerment. In many contexts, 
shareholder preferences may directly or indirectly urge wrong-termism 
actions. Where these investor-born impulses are irrational, investors might 
appreciate restraints on their own authority the way that Odysseus 
preferred being bound to the mast. He knew his own weaknesses and 
hoped for external scaffolding to improve his overall prospects. In these 
cases, it might be prudent if the law disempowered shareholders at the 
margin to prevent them from expressing these short-term impulses. 
Likewise, there is an argument for restraining shareholder power 
when investors have incorrect views about the causal contribution of 
certain temporal orientations to total wealth maximization. That is, if 
investors wrongly think quarterly capitalism helps them, there may be a 
case for weakening manager accountability. Though shareholders may not 
know it, they will use their influence to call for acts that make them worse 
off. 
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Conversely, it is presumptively appropriate to empower shareholders 
when the source of short-termism is a rational concern for the investor’s 
idiosyncratic needs. To make that claim more concrete, it might seem 
intuitive that if a shareholder genuinely needs full liquidity in one month, 
this counts as a reason to give her sufficient influence to ensure 
management will terminate projects incompatible with that time horizon. 
Likewise, when investors are correct that wrong-termism disciplines 
management, wrong-term pressures actually improve firm performance. 
Accordingly, legal and managerial efforts to frustrate shareholder power 
would not be justified even if linked to some conception of longer-term 
efficiency. 
Yet investor rationality is not itself the dispositive determinant of 
appropriate investor power. First, an investor with limited ability to control 
a firm and limited ability to sell its shares may be frustrated, but someone 
else—future customers or other investors in the firm—will be pleased that 
the firm avoided wrong-termism. There is no a priori way to evaluate the 
magnitude of these effects. It may be that the harm investors experience 
by having unsolved and genuine time horizon problems is worth the gain 
of protecting firms from wrong-termism. Thus, when investors are deemed 
to be rational wrong-termists due to their inborn liability horizons, it may 
militate in favor of or against shareholder empowerment; the case is 
uncertain. 
Second, empowering investors to influence management increases 
investors’ willingness to lobby for their preferred time horizon rather than 
pursuing other strategies. Insofar as other strategies such as asset transfer 
might have salutary features, it could prove costly to emphasize 
management influence. “[U]sing Hirschman’s . . . terminology, ‘exit’ is 
inconsistent with ‘voice.’”85 The value of investor power must be 
determined in light of its interaction with other responses. 
Berle and others urged improvements in market opportunities as a 
solution to wrong-termism because it lets wrong-term investors adjust 
their portfolio rather than influence the portfolio companies.86 If credit 
markets are perfect, then wrong-termist investors can borrow or lend to 
meet their idiosyncratic needs. If asset markets are perfect, then wrong-
termist investors can sell assets with the wrong horizon to other investors 
and buy instead the sorts of assets that are more temporally suitable. Often, 
this will indeed help with wrong-termism, particularly when the wrong-
termism is investor-born. 
                                                     
 85. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 375 (2006). See generally ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). 
86. See Berle, supra note 81. 
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On the other hand, liberal asset and liquidity transfer allows irrational 
investors to more fully express their erroneous views. For example, with 
liberal credit markets, asset-born wrong-termism may lead investors to 
borrow great sums against their portfolio firms in order to impose debt-
based discipline. If this is not a good way to improve performance of a 
given firm, this choice will be inefficient. Less liquid credit markets would 
place a friction on this conduct and help protect firms and investors from 
error. Likewise, liquid asset markets allow asset-based irrationally wrong-
termist investors to buy up more assets in order to impose their tactical 
myopia. 
And the same can be said of market-born wrong-termism. Investors 
who perceive widespread wrong-termist impulses in others may use ready 
credit and easy asset transfer to acquire myriad firms, demand wrong-
termed policies, and then resell them to a receptive secondary market. 
Greater frictions would restrict the influence of any local wrong-termism. 
Credit and asset transfer therefore affect wrong-termism in complex 
ways. Ready transfer eases the need for individual investors to autarkically 
impose wrong-termism upon their investments, but it also lowers the cost 
of those investors (or market-driven investors in their stead) acquiring 
more assets for the purpose of imposing an idiosyncratic time horizon.  
For example, we could imagine that the move from “credit and asset 
transfer unavailable” to “transfer available” results in substantial numbers 
of investors opting for transfer and relieves wrong-termist pressure on 
management. And we could likewise imagine that further reductions in 
transfer cost matter much only to sophisticated actors who frequently buy 
companies with an eye to imposing wrong-term policies and then reselling 
them. Low costs might matter more to such investors because they expect 
to bear that transfer cost twice as often (buying and selling). If this picture 
is accurate, then liberal asset transfer is not an unalloyed good. Instead, it 
has an optimal level, above which it increases market-born wrong-termism 
and below which it tolerates investor-born wrong-termism. The Figure 
below depicts such a relationship. 
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Market-based short-termism leads some investors to seek short-term 
objectives in order to increase perceived appeal to potential myopic third 
parties. Increasing shareholder power will help these controlling investors 
achieve that goal because it will allow a smaller number of activist 
investors to more easily alter the time horizon of companies before resale. 
This could be inefficient if it is based on inaccurate views about the desires 
of other investors, or if it is based on accurate views about the inefficient 
desires of other investors. In such cases, improving shareholder power will 
help them drive the company to worse results. Indeed, shareholder 
empowerment can be even worse when the source of short-termism is 
market-based or derivative, at least in the context of reasonably liquid 
markets because it will allow a relatively small number of activist 
investors to seek out and influence a large number of susceptible 
companies. 
One lesson from this Section is that many responses are not 
categorically effective. What helps control one source of wrong-termism 
may aggravate another. Either way, the interactions are complex and 
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difficult to categorically determine. They may also be dynamic: as asset 
liquidity increases, those best able to use it may enter the market and invest 
in complementary technology (e.g., services for monitoring companies 
suitable for purchase and intervention), and others may resist it (e.g., novel 
anti-takeover devices). There is probably not a single answer that holds 
over time. 
This suggests the importance of expanding the universe of options in 
search of less costly responses. Careful readers will notice that we have 
not yet discussed liability transfer. Section C goes on to show how liability 
transfer may be an unexplored area for improvement. 
C. Improving Liability Transfer 
We are familiar with the flexibility of liabilities in our everyday lives, 
but the potential for liability management as part of the response to wrong-
termism may elude us, in part because of the law’s role in creating many 
of the most important liability horizon structures. Recall that pension funds 
must invest to meet the liabilities of their beneficiaries, creating a set of 
pension-level obligations that are almost always assumed to be fixed.87 
There are plenty of ways that pension funds can respond to their 
given liability time horizon. They can exercise control rights to force 
managers to cater to their interest. They can borrow to fill funding gaps. 
They can sell long-lived investments to more patient investors as their 
liabilities come due. They can even buy financial derivatives that purport 
to pay them whatever they need. But all of these solutions leave risk for 
the fund. In the end, the pensioners are the fund’s liability and any non-
payment create serious risks to the fund and its managers. 
Rather than paying someone to help them manage their liability, 
pension sponsors might pay someone else to assume that liability. Then 
the pension sponsors could rest easy and feel no incentive toward wrong-
termism. This might be attractive if another firm is better at managing 
liabilities than the pension sponsor. More interestingly, a firm with 
offsetting wrong-termism could obtain an overall right-termist position by 
taking on these liabilities, just as a firm with assets suitable to a particular 
time horizon might find it convenient to match the liabilities. Finally, a 
pension fund is subject to a 50% excise tax on overfunding.88 Assuming 
we wish to keep this tax, pension funds will always be at a disadvantage 
                                                     
 87. See, e.g., Roy P.M.M. Hoevenaars et al., Strategic Asset Allocation With Liabilities: Beyond 
Stocks and Bonds, 32 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 2939, 2940 (2007) (“In making their strategic 
portfolio decisions, pension funds are restricted by their liabilities. . . . Liabilities are a predetermined 
component in the institutional investor’s portfolio.”). 
88. See discussion supra Part I.A.3. 
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when it comes to efficiently investing to meet their liabilities; far better to 
shift the obligation to someone not subject to that tax. 
The general term used for managing pension portfolios to address 
time horizons is “pension de-risking.”89 However, that term is too broad. 
It includes both asset transfer solutions and liability transfer solutions. 
Although we are more interested in the liability side, let us first consider 
the asset side. The asset transfer approach is often called an “internal” 
strategy.  
 
A very simple internal de-risking strategy of this type 
would be for a plan to simply purchase and hold annuities 
that paid out to the plan as the plan’s liabilities to 
pensioners came due. Other strategies attempt to reduce 
the volatility of the plan’s investments, such as 
purchasing high-grade bonds or hedging against 
undesirable market fluctuations. 90  
 
These “internal” strategies are relatively uncontroversial as a normative 
matter,91 though it bears noting that their legality was controversial until 
fairly recently.92 
More controversial are “external” strategies, which actually transfer 
the pension liabilities to a third-party payer.93 For example, General 
Motors paid Prudential to take over its defined benefit liabilities; 
Prudential took an enormous basket of securities as compensation—
enough to theoretically cover the liabilities, plus 7% as compensation for 
                                                     
 89. Paul M. Secunda & Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 735–
36 (2016). The myriad approaches for tailoring assets to match liabilities is sometimes called the 
Asset-Liability Management literature. 
 90. Id. at 740. 
 91. Id. at 739 (“[Such policies are] less worrisome because they do not transfer any risk to 
beneficiaries and are entirely governed by ERISA . . . .”). 
 92. It was only in 2006 that the Department of Labor clarified that it “does not believe that there 
is anything in the statute or the regulations that would limit a plan fiduciary’s ability to take into 
account the risks associated with benefit liabilities or how those risks relate to the portfolio 
management in designing an investment strategy.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Opinion Letter on Application 
of the Fiduciary Responsibility Provisions of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, 3 (Oct. 3, 2006). That is to say that the Department of Labor blessed some amount of liability-
driven investment as compatible with the various ERISA constraints on plan providers. See, e.g., 
ERISA of 1974 § 403(c); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c) (2012), 404(a)(1)(A), 1104(a)(1)(A) (requiring plan 
fiduciaries to discharge duties solely in the interest of plan participants); id. §§ 404(a)(1)(B), 
1104(a)(1)(B) (2012) (requiring “care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims”). There had been some concern that 
consideration of time horizons might not be among those various requirements. 
93. Secunda & Maher, supra note 89, at 740. 
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bearing the risk and managing the program.94 These are real liability 
transfers—the accepting firm is the only one on the hook for the pension 
liabilities going forward. And these transfers have become a major 
phenomenon in recent years. “In the last few years, for example, Verizon, 
General Motors, Ford, Motorola, and Bristol-Myers Squibb have all 
undertaken pension de-risking transactions. Together, these transactions 
were worth over $100 billion and affected hundreds of thousands of 
workers, retirees, and their beneficiaries.”95 
As big as pension de-risking has become, it may be at a crossroads. 
It is fair to say that external pension de-risking has a bad name among 
ERISA scholars. Secunda and Maher refer to “pension de-risking” as 
“troubling.”96 They are worried that pension de-risking removes protective 
regulation and government-overseen insurance from pensioners, 
potentially leaving them in the lurch, and they see de-risking as just one 
aspect of a corporate and government agenda that is hostile to defined 
benefit plans.97 They would accordingly curtail external de-risking 
programs to a great degree. 
While Professors Secunda and Maher are certainly right about the 
potentials for abuse, they give short shrift to the potential benefits of 
pension de-risking. They do not consider the possibility that the best bearer 
of plan risk may not be the employer corporation, that the optimal bearer 
may change through time, and that there may be social costs from forcing 
the wrong party to bear this risk. The social cost is, among other things, 
the wrong-term influence that the bearer may exert on management.98 
There are myriad other ways that the law currently encourages wrong-
terming by ossifying fixed liability structures, and it is worth asking 
whether there could be a more liberal market for liability transfers without 
creating undue problems. 
                                                     
 94. Leslie Scism, Your Pension Check May Soon Be Coming from an Insurance Company, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/that-pension-you-earned-may-soon-be-coming-
from-someone-else-1489342032. 
 95. Secunda & Maher, supra note 89, at 736. 
 96. Id. at 733. 
 97. Id. at 738 (“[T]he underlying motivation is the same. An employer made a [defined benefit] 
promise long ago. Afterward, it determines that its current strategy for keeping the pension promise is 
too costly or too afflicted with uncertainty.”). 
 98. It is not enough to retort that employers unable to bear the risk of a defined benefit plan ought 
not to create them, and to imply that those who seek to avoid existing liabilities must be engaging in 
a bait and switch—promise one thing and try not to deliver. The company may have had a fine ability 
to satisfy this policy at one point but faces different horizon constraints as time goes on, which raise 
the cost of supporting the plan. 
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Fund de-risking is an interesting example of liability transfer, and it 
raises a number of general concerns about what it would take to have a 
robust liability transfer market. 
First, creditors of the liability transferring party could lose out if their 
liabilities are transferred without their consent to lower quality payers. 
This is a general problem of opportunism through novation. But if a 
creditor’s consent is requested, the creditor could engage in holdup. In 
some ways, we are watching the tension between these two points of view 
in the pension de-risking literature.99 
Second, and more interestingly, there are economic barriers to 
unilateral liability transfer. An investor selling assets oftentimes sells them 
into a highly liquid market in which they are a price taker. However, we 
do not currently observe robust markets for most liabilities.100 There are 
not rich secondary markets into which individuals offset their 
commitments to third parties. This is in part because of the holdup problem 
above; how can you create sensible secondary markets if creditors must be 
consulted on each novation? 
There are other problems with liquid liability markets. Stock 
exchanges have thrived more frequently than bond exchanges because 
most companies issue only one large class of permanent stock, but 
companies issue myriad bonds with varying durations, making a fungible 
and permanent market difficult. A similar problem would plague those 
who alienate liabilities. Unless only a few parties stood as creditors in 
myriad liabilities, then each set of liabilities transferred would be sui 
generis. By accepting my liability transfer, you pick up duties to my 
beneficiaries, who are not creditors on any other transferor’s liabilities. No 
meaningful market could develop for any but the largest liability 
transfers.101 
Any seller of an instrument who knows the instrument better than the 
buyer will face an adverse selection discount. If a corporation seeks to 
offset its expected $100 million pension obligation for $105 million, the 
potential assumer of the obligation may conclude that the ceding party has 
gotten an early peek that their obligations may be running higher than 
expected. At a minimum, they would not be selling at $105 million if they 
had learned that their obligations were running cheaper than expected. 
And this dynamic iterates. Knowing that liability-assumers will 
distrust anyone who seeks to alienate a liability and accordingly demand 
                                                     
 99. See generally Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles 
of Contracts, 111 MICH. L. REV. 715 (2013) (describing this double holdup problem). 
 100. The exception is the market for liabilities of entities whose principal role is product 
liabilities (e.g., banks). 
 101. The suggestion below that liabilities be securitized would help with this problem, of course. 
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an outsized premium, the only folks who will come to market with their 
liabilities are those who know their liabilities are sufficiently bad as to 
keep up with a steep premium. And that inauspicious fact will further drive 
up the premium. It is pretty easy to imagine such a market collapsing. 
The same thing can happen with the market for assets; issuers of 
securities face thin markets at first102 and may pay a discount for adverse 
selection when they issue equity.103 However, we have solved this problem 
in some ways. A variety of laws and institutions help construct a deep 
market for assets first offered.104 And adverse selection for individual 
securities can be solved in part by trading diversified baskets of 
securities.105 
Could we use similar solutions to help ease liability transfer? One 
could imagine creating diversified portfolios of de-risked assets, so that 
one could not infer inside knowledge about any one pension from an 
individual buyer or seller’s order. If hundreds of companies engage in de-
risking, their obligations could be combined into an instrument with 
diversified exposure. For example, a special purpose entity (SPE) could be 
ceded with securities sufficient to cover the expected cost of the pension 
liabilities. In turn, the SPE could be owned by a guaranteeing Master SPE 
(MSPE), which is ceded with cash and bonds sufficient to pay the SPE 
obligations under even bad scenarios. Interests in the MSPE could be sold 
to the public with the notion that the MSPE surplus is their property—and 
is expected to be significant. 
To be clear, the purpose of this instrument is not to assure everyone 
that the investment will be safe. Diversification may alleviate risk, but the 
companies issuing liabilities may be sufficiently bad that the risks remain 
real; they may be correlated risks, or at least varying alongside ordinary 
macroeconomic events; and the overall risk will really depend on the 
amount of securities shoring up the basket. Rather, the crucial point is that 
by bundling them, the secondary market can breathe relief at the risk of 
adverse selection. Someone shorting the basket would have to know 
important private information about several obligations. Since that is 
unlikely, liability securitization could help protect this market. 
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Modest support for liability transfer would mean that the Department 
of Labor and Congress would continue to liberalize rules on de-risking. 
More ambitious programs would involve government support of a market 
to overcome the various problems outlined above. We could imagine a 
Fannie and Freddie for pension transfers or other liabilities. A government 
agency or entity could facilitate the construction of liability bundles—
perhaps exercising the federal government’s special relationship to the 
municipalities and states that make up so much of the debtor pool. Liability 
transfer is an unfamiliar concept, but it presents great potential—both for 
portfolio optimization generally and with respect to the wrong-termism 
debate. 
CONCLUSION 
Investor time horizons are a perennial source of controversy: Do 
idiosyncratic horizons exist? Do they affect firm behavior? Are such 
effects for the best or worthy of intervention? 
This Article has attempted to assist that debate with conceptual 
clarification: a new term, wrong-termism; a sense of the sources and 
solutions available, as well as their interaction; and an invitation to give 
greater attention to one largely ignored channel for horizon-proofing, 
liability transfer. With luck, incremental, conceptual, empirical, and 
normative projects can improve the state of American capitalism and the 
debates surrounding it. 
 
